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1. INTRODUCTION 
The characterization of external effects as "separable" has 
played an important role in the development of the theory of externalities. 
The separable case appears particularly well behaved when procedures 
for achieving an optimum allocation of resources in the presence of 
externalities are examined. For example, Davis and Whinston [1962] 
find that separability assures the existence of a certain kind of equilib­
rium in bargaining between firms which create externalities, and that 
equilibrium does not exist without sepal·ability. Kncese and Bower 
[1968] argue that with separability the computation of Pigovian taxes 
to remedy externalities is particularly simple. Marchand and Russell 
[1974] demonstrate that certain liability rules regarding external effects 
lead to Pareto optimal outcomes if and only if' externalities are separable. 
We will argue in this paper that whenever an externality 
affecting a firm is separable, the production set of that firm is not convex 
1 in a neighborhood of zero output. The proposition is established by 
redefining separability in a manner which allows for the fact that in 
the long run a firm will shut down rather than accept negative profits. 
These definitions yield the theorem that separability implies a non· 
convexity of th$'l production function, which may result in a discontinuous 
supply correspondence. 
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Since the discontinuity is a consequence of market structure, 
i.e. the actions of other firms, rather than a characteristic of tech­
nology alone, it is possible that equilibriurn will exist despite the 
disconti11uity. We prove that with 11complete separability," a case 
in which the production function is linear in productive inputs, the 
discontinuity disappears in equilibrium. 'When the production function 
exhibits decreasing returns in some range, we argue that the aggregate 
supply correspondence will be continuous if the number of firms which 
can earn non-negative profits in equilibrium is independent of equilibrium 
prices. We conclude with examples of conditions under which this 
independence will and will not obtain. In passing we establish an 
intimate connection between externalities and the number of firms 
in an economy. 
II. SEPARABILITY AND NONCONVEXITY 
Standard proofs of the existence of equilibrium of a compe­
titive economy employ assumptions regarding the convexity of pro­
duction sets which are violated when separable extei:nalities are 
present. Arrow and Hahn [1972] for example, assume in proving: 
existence with externalities that the production set of firm i is convex 
in the variables ·controlled by firm i for every activity chosen by other 
firms. 
It appear�, therefore, that a case of some importance in 
applied welfare economics, the case of separable externality, is in 
an anomalous theoretical position: the fundamental question of whether 
a competitive equilibrium can exist in this case is unresolved, In this 
section we will demonstrate the existence of a nonconvexity. In the final 
three sections we will explore two subjects: the considerations which 
determine the existence of equilibrium and the implications of noncon­
vcxity for market structure wi'th separable externalities. 
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Although much of the literature deals with cost functions, it 
is possible to define a separable externality in two ways. 
Let C( Y 1, Y 2, • • • •  Y m) be the cost function of a firm which 
produces Y 1, and suffers an external diseconomy which is a functiori 
of the output of other firms Y ., j ::: 2,,,,, m. The cost function is 
J 
dual to the production function F(X}, • • •  , Xn, Y2, • • •  , Ym ) where X's 
are inputs. 
Conventional definitions of separability become inappropriate 
in cases in which the firm has the option of going out of business. Hence 
we define separability on the strictly positive real numbers and extend 
the separable functions to the non-negative orthant. 
n Let R+ + be the 
n-dimensional space of strictly positive real vectors which contains 
(X1, • •  ,, �), and let R:
- l be the m-1 dimensional space of non-negative 
-Vectors which contains { Y2, • • •  , Ym)' 
If we define separability of the production function with respect 
to externalities in the conventional fashion by stating that a production 
function is separable iff it can be written as g {X1, • • •  , Xn} + h(Y 2, • • •  , Yrn) 
for all (X1, ••• , X ) E R
n and ( Y2,, • •  , Y ) E R
m- l , the nonsensical n + m + 
possibility exists that Y < 0 for some values of X. and Y.. Let· 1 ' J 
n m-1 �(F) = [(X1, • • •  ,Xn, Yz•''''Ym) E R+X R+ :F{X1, • • •  ,Xn' 
Y2, ••• , Y ) > O}. The function F: Rn X Rm-l_� R1· is defined to m + + + 
be equal to zero on {R: X R�-
l
)\il(F). Separability is a property which 
we need only require on �(F).
Definition 1: A production function F:R: X Rzi-l  � R! is separable 
if and only if it can be written as g(X1,, • •  ,Xn) + h(Y2, • • •  , Ym) for all 
(Xi•···•xn, Y2, • • •  ,Ym) E lll(F). 
Sine� we deal entirely with external diseconomy, h( • ) < 0 
and h1 < O. The cost function is derived from the production fun�tion 
by finding the minimum cost of producing Y 1 when other firms are 
producing (Y2, . • .  , Ym). When F > 0 the cost function is found as 
the dual of the production function in the conventional manner. We 
define ct;(O, Y2,,.,, Y
m
) = 0 for all ("i'."z• • • •  , Y
m
), 
Definition 2: A cost function C(Y 1, Y 2, • . •  , Ym) is separable with 
respect to externalities if and only if it can be written as 
c1(Y1)+ c2(Y2, • . •  ,Ym) for all Y 1 >0, 
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Note that a cost function is separable with respect to externalities 
if and only if aY3
2
3
Cy = O in R
1 
XR
m
-
l 
We as flume tlaroughout that 1 j + + + 
F is continuously twice differentiable on ;&(F) and that C is continuously 
twice differentiable on R�+ XR�-l A production function is separable 2 
with respect to externalities if and only if a�.�Y. = 0 in il(F). ' J 
To make F and C \Vell behaved in their entire domain we assume that 
F--?> 0 as (X1, • • •  ,Xn' Y2, • • •  , Ym) approach the boundary of .iSl(F). 
That is, let ;ti(F) = {(X 1, . • •  , Xn' Y 2, • • •  , Ym) : g(X 1, • • • , Xm) 
+ h(Y2, • . .  , Ym) = 0}, By hypothesi$ Fis continuous on il(F), and, since 
n m-
1 \ n m -1 \ . . F = 0 on (R + .X R + ) £l(F), on (R+ X R + ) il(F). Then F is continuous 
everywhere if and Only if F� 0 whenever (X1, • • •  ,Xn' Y2, • • •  , Ym) � �(F). 
We assume also that C is continuous ever}'\vhere in its domain, and that 
Fis mon9tonic increasing in (X 1, • • •  , Xn) on il(F). 
We can now establish the existence of a nonconcavity in the 
production function. 
Theorem l: a) if the production function is separable, it is not concave 
in a neighborhood of _ii(F). b) If the cost function is separable, the 
production function is not convex in a neighborhood of Y 1 = 0, 
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Proof: a) Let (:k, Y) = (X 1, • • •  ,Xn,Y2 • • • •  ,Ym) El1(F). Then F(X1 + e, 
X2 + e:, • • •  , Xn+ e:,Y2, • • •  ,Ym) > 0, andF(X 1 e: • • • •  ,Xn - e:, y2····· 
Y ) = 0 for any e > 0. If F is concave, cr.F(X + e, YJ + (1 - a.)F(X - e:, Y)m 
< F(n(X + e).+ (! - n}(X - e}, Y} = F((X - e + Zne}, Y} = 0 if n = 1/2. 
But 1/2 F(:k + e:, Y) + 1/2 F{X - e:, YJ = 1/2 F(X + e:,YJ > 0. Hence F(X, YJ 
is not concave. 
b) The argument for m = 2 generalizes immediately to. general m. 
Hence let m = 2. If the cost function is separable, then C(Y 1, Y2) > c2(Y 2)
for all Y 1 > O, Y 2 > O. Let X(Y 1, Y 2) be an input vector which is a solution 
of the problem: minimize W • X subject to F(X 1, ,  • •  , Xn, Y 2l = Y l' 
where Y 1 > 0. Then with a separable cost function W• X(Y 1• Y2) > c2(Y 2) 
for all Y1>0. Since X(O,Y2) = (O, . • •  ,O) for all Y2 > 0, concavity of 
F implies that for X = X, some fixed vector, 
nF(X, Yzl + (I - n}F(O, Yzl < F(nX, Yzl
for all a. E (0, 1). Hence it mu·st be true that aF (X, Y2) < F(o.X, Y2). 
Now choose a sufficiently small that w• o.X < c2(Y 2), This is only 
possible if Y1 = F(a.X, Y2) = 0, But then a.F{X', Y2) > F(a.X';Y�) = 0, 
and the production function is not Concave, I! 
Theorem J can_ be illustrated heuristically. When the 
production is separable, the marginal productivity of any factor used 
by firm 1 is independent of Y 2, the output of firm 2. Therefore at an 
interior maximum for which the first order conditions are necessary, 
firm l's input thoice is independent of the acitivty of firm?.. When the 
cost function is separable, marginal cost of producing Y 1 is independent 
of Y2, and firm l 1s output choice is independent of firm 21s activity. 
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If both the production function and the cost function are separable, then 
input and output of firm 1 are independent of firm 2's activity.
2 
These propositions can be illustrated diagrammatically in a 
simple fp.shion for the one-input case, It is possible to find a differential 
equation which must be satisfied by any production function generating 
a separable cost function.
3 
When there is just one input, denoted X,
the differential equation is 
FYFYX - FyFXX = O. 
The function F which solves this equation is of the form F = A(X + h(Y)) 
where A and h are arbitrary .functions restricted to pres"erve the 
4 
concavity of F. In each figure the productipn function satisfies 
F(O, Y2) = O; i.e. , it goes through the origin. In Figure 1 the 
production function is characterized by decreasing returns and 
separability. Since the same input choice must be profit n1aximizing 
for all Y2, changes in Y2 shift the production function vertically, 
keeping the slope of F(X, Y2) the same for constant X. 
In Figure 2 a production function of the form F(X - h(Y 2)) 
is drawn. Changing Y 2 in this case shifts the production function 
horizontally, so that the slope of F is constant for constant Y1• Th
is 
production function generates a separable cost function. 
Figure 3 illustrates complete separability, i.e. the production 
function is se"parable and generates a separable cost function. Such a 
function must have the property that the slope of F(X, Y 2) equals the 
slope of F(X, Y2_) for constant X and also for constant Y 1• For this 5 
to be true for all X and Y 1, F must be linear in X. 
III. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIU1v1 WITH COMPLETE SEPARABILITY 
With one input it is only possible to have complete separability 
when the production function is_ linear _in X 1• In this case the nonconcavity 
7 
YI 
- g(X1) - h(O) 
g(X1) - h(Yzl 
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xi 
Figure 1: Separable Production Function 
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yl 
yl 
F(x1 - h(Y2>)
xi
Figure 2: Separable Cost Function 
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g(Xl)
g(X1) - h(Yz)
' 
' 1 l h(Y2l x 
! 
I, 
Figure 3: Complete Separability 
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of the production function disappears in equilibrium. A firm affected by 
a completely separable externality will have the supply correspondence 
illustrated in Figure 4. If p1/w1 exceeds the {constant) slope of the pro­
duction function, the firm can earn unb�unded profits. If p1/w1 is less 
than the slope of the production function, the firm earns negative profits 
for all output greater than zero. If Y 2 > 0, the same is true when p1/w1 
equals the slope of the production function. Hence the supply correspon­
dence is not continuous (or even defined} at a point p 1/w1 equal to that slope. 
Despite this discontinuity in the individual supply correspondence, 
equilibrium will exist. Suppose that firm i has production function 
a.X. - b. Y .• We ask if there is any price raHo such that when both 
1 l l J 
firms maxin1ize profits Yi> 0 for both, 1.'{e know that the equilibrium 
prices must be such that p/wi � ai, for i = 1, 2. Otherwise some firm 
will produce unbounded output. If p1/w1 < a1, then firm 1 produces 
nothing and firm 2 is unaffected by externality, and hence p2/w2 = a2 
is an equilibrium price. Now suppose pi /w i = ai' i = 
1, 2. If Y l > 0
and Y 2 >. 0, then both firms are earning negative profits and cannot 
be in equilibrium. If Y 1 = 0 and Y 2 > 0 then any finite output level 
gives firm 2 zero profits and is in equilibrium. Moreover, given that 
Y2 > 0, firm l cannot do better than choose Y 1 = 0. Hence prices 
p1/w1�a1, p2/w 2 = a2, Y1 = 0, Y 2.> O is an equilibrium, Permuting: 
the indices gives another equilibrium. 
In this case we can have multiple equilibria, each with just 
one firm producing nonzero output. It does not matter which firm is 
out of business. This is characteristic of constant returns, since 
one firm can produce any level of output using the same total input 
which would be used if the output were divided among many firms. 
Normally COJ;lstant returns imply that the number of firms in an industry 
is indeterminate. With constant returns and separable externality in 
an industry, the size of an industry is_ one firm, 
The arguments given for two firms �lso apply to the case of n 
fir1ns. If it is impossible to have two firms simultaneously maximizing 
Y. 
' 
A 
11 
l if Y2 = 0, this section of the supply 
correspondence exists 
if Y2 f 0, it does not 
pi
/
wi 
Figure 4 
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profits and producing positive output, it is impossible to have n, since 
comparing any two firms, we find only one is in operation, Thus we 
have proved the following theorem, 
Theorem 2: If all externalities are completely separable, and hi 1- 0 
in the neighborhood of equilibrium, then in equilibrium only one firm 
affected by externalities produces nonzero output. 
IV. DISCONTINUITY IN AGGREGATE SUPPLY 
Problems of existence of equilibrium can onl� arise when 
separability is combined with nonconstant returns, as in Figures 1 
and 2. Because of the simpler functional forms involved, we concentrate 
on the case of a separable production function F = f(X1,.,., Xn) 
+ g{Y�, • .  , , Ym) where f is strictly concave. We will show that if the 
number of firms which can earn non-negative profits changes as prices 
change, the supply correspondence will not be continuous, Consider 
an example of two firms, only one of which is affected significantly by 
the externality, That is, assume 
F1 = g1(X1i - h1(Y2) 
and 
Fz = g2(X2) 
Assume for simpliC:ity that both firms produce identical good s ,  arid 
use identical inputs. Then aggregate supply by these firms is Y
1 
+ Y2 
and aggregate input demand is x1 + x2• With externality going only 
one way it is not difficult to determine how Y1 + Y2 will vary with p/w. 
At any price ratio firm Z will set 
9Fz 
"Xz 
w 
p 
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The output thus determined is taken as a parameter by firm l in choosing 
its optimal supply. We take a simple example: 
YI 
.!. a= xi 
Yz 
p 
-
hY 2 
I 
a xz 
where a> 1. Then maximizing profits firm 2 will choose
a 
and 
x = (..E..) 2 aw 
a-l 
I 
( a-1 Yz = ;!;)
Firm l will choose 
or 
x, = 0 
a 
( r-
l 
x = . ..E.. 1 aw 
depending on whether or not it can earn non-ne.gative profits. We can 
write firm l's profits, nl
. as a function of p/w. 
Since 
"1 
l 
( )
a-1
y = ..E.. 1 aw 
.L
h(* f"'
p ..!!_ 
= p[(;;;rl - h(*f-lJ w (;l;;;f-1 
I 
= (;;J;;:i[p §.:! ph(;;f"' �!]
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Since a> l,  this expression is positive if 
�
(1--!;)>h(;,1;;;) a-1
Three cases, which differ in terms of the change in marginal damage 
when Y2 increases, can be distinguished. Margii:al damage, defined as 
o
2F o2F oF1 
oY2 
· · · ·r 1 ·r 1 o d d · is mcreasmg i --2- > O; constant i --2- = , an ecreasmg oY
2 oY2 
;/F 
ii --1 < o. 
oY
2 
2
�: If marginal damage is constant, f3 = 1 and the sign of profit 
is independent of p/w, de;,>ending only on whether 1 - l/a > h, in 
which case profits are always positive, or l - l/a < h, in which case
profits are always negative. Since firm 2 produces non-zero output 
for all p/w f. 0, 1 -l/a > h in1plies that firm 1 can always produce 
some output. The supply function then is 
...!... 1 
yl + y2 
2 (;,i;tl h (*rl 
_1_ 
/. 
)
a-1 
(2 -h \* 
If 1 - 1/ a > h, the supply function is 
yl + Yz 
--'--
� )
a-1
y2 = 
...E.. 
aw . 
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Both functions are continuous, and n o  problems can arise. 
l:! � a-1
Case 2: If marginal damage is increasing, then {J > l and h -E-\ --- aw} 
is an increasing function of p/w. It is always possible to choose p/w 
small enough that 
H 
(1 - �) , hfa;-rl 
Therefore for low values of p/w firm 1 can earn positive profits. 
As p/w increases, however. we can choose a large enough value to make 
i!.:.! 
(1 - �) < h(a;-)"-l 
so that profits become negative, Let R be that value of p/w for which 
1 
i - a
i!.:.! 
h (*)°-1
.Then for p/w � R, .total supply is 
1 ..JL 
( )
a-1
yl + y2 = 
2 � h(*rl 
For p/w � R, 
_l_ 
YI+ Yz y2 = (*r-
1
(I) 
(2) 
Solving for R in
gives 
l i - a
l 
;;-R 
@.:! 
( )a
-1
= h �R 
a-1 
(·.� if
-1 
Substituting R. for p/w in ( l' ) gives 
_§__ l 
y l + y = 2 l.!!...::..l)l'l-l 2 \ ah h (·.� l
tl 
l 
(1 + �)(·.� ltl 
and in ( 2 ) gives 
y
l + Yz (•.;; 
ltl 
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(3) 
Since ( 3 ) > { 4 ) .  the total supply function will jwnp at R, since 
( 1 ), which defines the supply function up to R, is strictly greater 
than ( 2 ) which defines the supply function from R on. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
fr:!.
( )a-
1 · 
Case 3: If marginal damage is decreasing, then {3< 1 and h _E_ --- aw 
is a dec.reasing function of p/w. By a train of reasoning identical to
17 
_that used in Case 2 we can establish that for p/w < R firm l cannot
earn positive profits; for p/w > R it can. Therefore the supply 
function is ( 3 ) for 0 < p/w :::; R and ( z ) for p/w > R. We have 
established that ( 2 ) > ( 3 ) at R. Therefore the supply function jumps, 
as in Figure 6, These discontinuities can interfere with the existence 
of equilibrium, If the demand curve for Y 1 +· Y 2 goes through the 
discontinuity, it will never be possible to achieve exact equality between 
supply and demand, This is more likely in Case 3, of course, since 
in Case 2 a demand curve must have a positive slope to pass through the 
discontinuity and not intersect the supply curve, 
Such a discontinuity does not necessarily preclude the possi­
bility of proving the existence of equilibrium, although the proof 
becomes more difficult. The standard argument (Arrow and Hahn [1971 J, 
p. 169-171, Rothenberg [1960}) is that as more firms and consumers are 
introduced into the economy it becomes possible to choose various com­
binations of firms producing zero output and firms producing positive 
output to approximate demand at the price for which the discontinuity 
exists. Such an argument cannot necessarily be made in this case. 
As Rothenberg [1960] pointed out, there is no guarantee that non-
convexities arising from externalities will vanish as the number of 
agents in the economy increases. The discontinuity caused by one­
way, separable externality will change in different ways depending 
on how the. economy is expanded. If we let the number· of polluting 
firms increase while holding constant the nu1nber of sufferers, the 
discontinuity will vanish since the firms affected by the nonconvexity 
become small relative to the economy. If both classes are increased 
at the same rate, the size of the discontinuity relative to aggregate 
supply may remain roughly constant. 
18 
yl + y2 
Y1 + Yz 
p/w 
Figure 5 
Case 2: Increasing Marginal Damage 
v 
' 
' 
R • p/w 
Figure 6 
Case 3: Decreasing Marginal Damage 
1 9  
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v. THE CASE OF CONSTANT MARGINAL DAMAGE 
When marginal damage is constant, it becomes possible to 
find conditions under which the number of firms earning non-negative 
profits is independent of prices, so that no discontinuities which cause 
p�oblems of existence of equilibrium will arise. In such a case the 
number of firms may be determined by the degree of convexity of the 
production function. "\Ve assun1e now that all firms are identical and 
that externalities go in both directions. 
The analysis of cases in which there are mutu
.
al externalities 
and decreasing returns is complex, since to define the total supply 
correspondence we must make sure that the supply response of any firm 
to given prices is profit maximizing with respect not only to the prices 
but also with respect to the decision of the other firm (Montgomery f1975b]). 
When this is done, it appears that for some production functions it is 
impossible for more than one firm to earn positive profits at any prices; 
in some cases two firms can earn positive profits at all prices; in others 
more firms can. Whenever market structure is thus independent of prices, 
the system is well behaved and the aggregate supply correspondence 
exhibits no discontinuities. 
Assume two identical firms i = 1, 2, with production functions 
l/n 
Y1= Xi -hYj' 
At any price ratio p/w the input choice of firm i will be either 
x - (_p_\a./a-1
i - aw) 
or Xi :::: 0, depending on whether Yj is such that firn1 
earn non-negative profits. 
can or cannot 
We begin by assuming that both firms are operating at interi
.
or 
maxima. We know the input of Xi; but output Yi depend.a on the output of 
firm j. which in turn depends on Yi. We cut through this chaiil by solving 
Yi 
Therefore 
and 
_l_ l 
=(;fl h [(;t
l 
- h Yi]
ni 
Y. '
_1_ 
a-1 
1 � h (;)
):l� J:a �J _ (.E. a 1-a - p w l't""h - a 
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{4) 
Profits Tii will be positive, with both firms in operation, for all prices 
when h is less than some critical value. We solve 
l 
1-'"a" 
m 
a 
1-a a 0
to find this critical value, which is h :::: a, .. - I. Since a is a measure 
. of how strongly returns to scale decrease, it is a relation between the 
magnitude of the externality and returns to scale \vhich determines how 
many firms can operate in equilibrium. Since the possibility of earning 
non-negatiVe profits is independent of p/w, the economy will always have 
two firms operating if h < a - l, and one firm if h > a - 1. This su3gests that if a is sufficiently large, it may be possible 
to have more than two firms in operation. Suppose there are n + 1 
identical firms, with production functions 
Y i 
l a x· i - hI;Y. 
j;li J 
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Clearly every firm which is in operation will choose identical Xi. Thus 
we can again solve 
( )
a:l � a:l ]Y. = _E._ • h1; (_£._) · . lmY 
i aw j¢i aw l 
l l 
= (;;;ti . 1m[(;;;t
l 
. lmYl] (5 I
where the substitution nY 1 = LY. follows from the fact that all firms 
in operation will produce idenifda1 output. Since (5) is identical ta (;4·)
except that h is replaced by nh, it follows that 
n. > o 
• 
for all if nh < a - l 
For example, if h is just less than 1, and a. =  3, n + 1 
earn positive profits simultaneously. 
3, firms can 
Two tentative conclusions about conditions under which 
competitive equilibrium \vill exist follow, 
1) If, relative to the number of firms affected by separable 
externalities, the number of firms not affected by separable externality 
is large, and those firms are able to produce the same outputs and us.e the 
sa.me inputs as firms affected by externality, equilibrium will exist. 
2) If the separable production function is linear in the output of 
other firms, so that marginal damage is constant, equilibrium will 
exist. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Wellisz, Starrett, and Inada and Kuga have also noticed that 
externalities imply nonconvexity. Starrett, and Inada and Kuga, 
however, consider a different type of nonconvexity. They_ 
examine a general equilibrium system in which a market exists 
for each externality, and demonstrate that when a firm ceases 
operation rather than suffer an externality, a nonconvexity can 
arise independent of separability. The nonconvexity considered 
in this paper arises even in a system in which no markets exist 
in which externalities are traded, We will examine the conse-
quences of this nonconvexity for the existence of competitive 
equilibrium in an economy in which the trading of externalities 
is impossible. Wellisz comes closer to recognizing the non­
convexity we consider, since he points out that separable exter­
nalities impose fixed costs \Vhich may drive some firms out of 
business. 
2. These propositions corect the claim by Wellisz [1964] that 
se'parable externalities do not affect resource allocation. It 
is true that the cost-function separability which he considers 
implies that the allocation of output is unaltered, but in general 
the allocation of input is affected by devices which "internalize" 
external effects, 
3. See Montgomery [1975aJ, 
4. There are two obvious ways of generalizing the form F = A(X + h(Y2)) 
to the n-input case: F = B(X1 + h1(Y2),.,., Xn + hn(Y2)) -:vhere B 
5. 
25 
and h1, . • •  , hn are arbitrary functions, or F = A(g(X1, • • •  , Xn) + h(Y 2)) 
where A and h are arbitrary functions and the Hessian determinant 
I g .. J = 0. Both are solutions of (1), Though they bear some obvious 
,, 
resemblances to each other, it does not appear that either is the 
most general form of a solution of (1 ). It is known that any linear 
combination is also a solution (Ford [1955]). 
Proved in Montgomery [1975a ].
References 
Arrow, K. J., and Hahn, F. [1971J. General Competitive Analysis. 
(San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1971}, 
Davis, 0. A., and Whinston, A. [1962}. 11Externalities, Welfare, 
and the Theory of Games." Journal of Political Economv, 
vol. 70 (June 1962). 
Ford, Lester [1955}. Differential Equations. (New Yorli, 1955), 
'26 
In.ada, K., and Kuga, K. [1973}. 11Limitations of the 1Coase Theorem' on 
Liability Rules. 11 Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 6 (December, 1973). 
Kneese, S., and Bower, B. [196BJ. Managing Water Quality: Economies, 
Technology, Institution. (Baltimore, 1968). 
�1archand, J. R., and Russell, K. P. (1973]. "Externalities, Liability, 
Separability, and Resource Allocation. 11 American Economic Review, 
vol. 63 (September 1973). 
Montgomery, W. D. [1975a]. 11Separability and Vanishing Externalities," 
California Institute of Technology Social Science Working Paper No. 74, 
1975,  forthcoming in American Economic Review, December 1975. 
Montgomery, \'{. D. (1975b]. "Stability of Pure Trade Equilibrium with 
Externalities, 11 California Institute of Technology Social Science 
Working Paper No. 76, 1975. 
Rothenberg, J. (1960]. "Non-convexity, Aggregation, a:na Pareto Optimality." 
Journ�l of Political Economy, vol. 68, (October 1960). 
27 
Starrett, D. [1972]. °Fundamental Non-convexities in the Theory of 
Externalities. 11 Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 4, (April 1972). 
WellisJ?:, S. (1964], "On External Disecanomies and the Government­
Assisted Invisible Hand." Econornica. vol. 31, (November 1964). 
